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Abstract: The New Labour government was accused of frenzied law making, creating a criminal 
offence for every day spent in office. The current government, responding to these concerns, has 
introduced a “gateway” mechanism to halt the tide of criminalisation. New research suggests that 
the accusations levelled against the last government badly underestimated the reality: criminal 
offences were – and despite the gateway mechanism, are still – created at a far greater rate than 
one a day. But what does this actually mean? This article reviews the available evidence on the 
extent of the criminal law, including recent research by the author and others, noting the 
characteristics of new criminal offences, which are typically directed towards the regulation of 
particular activities rather than the general public, but frequently potentially carry severe maximum 
penalties and should not be wrongly dismissed as trivial and/or regulatory. While acknowledging the 
significant rate at which criminal offences are committed, it casts doubt on the common assumption 
that this is something which has increased substantially in recent years. It explores how the vast 
quantity of criminal offences on the statute book can be reconciled with the doctrinal treatment of 
criminal law as a somewhat narrower topic, and concludes by analysing the extent to which critiques 
made of criminalisation in modern practice, particularly in relation to the claims made about the 
New Labour government, are borne out by the available evidence. 
 
Introduction 
Lawyers over a certain age will remember Statutes in Force, a collection of brown loose-leaf binders 
containing copies of Acts of Parliament, thematically arranged by topic rather than year. Launched in 
1972 and regularly updated thereafter, it was an attempt to provide an accurate and up-to-date 
version of all primary legislation in force in the United Kingdom.
1
 In practical terms, it was a failure, 
affected badly by delays in updates being provided, so that it could not be relied upon as an 
authoritative source of the law as it currently stood.
2
 Eventually derided as a white elephant,
3
  it 
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ceased publication in 1991,
4
 to be gradually replaced by the Statute Law Database,
5
 now maintained 
by the National Archives and freely available online.
6
 
While this is a substantial improvement in the accessibility of legislation, the sheer volume of 
statutory material produced in the United Kingdom is remarkable, and appears to have grown very 
substantially in the second half of the twentieth century.
7
 This means that it is difficult for any 
database to be entirely free from error, something vividly demonstrated in R v Chambers,
8
 where 
shortly before the disposal of an appeal, it was discovered that the Regulations which had been 
relied upon to prosecute the appellant – and others – had in fact been superseded seven years 
earlier. The necessary updates had not been made either to the Statute Law Database or to a 
commercial database used by the prosecuting authorities, and so prosecutions had continued on the 
basis of outdated law. 
Complaints about the inaccessibility of legislation, and the difficulty in establishing what the law is 
on a particular topic, are nothing new.
9
 A related point, however, receives rather less attention, 
which is that we have very little sense of what the statute book as a whole actually consists of. While 
the term “statute book” is a convenient shorthand for the “totality of the statute law in force at any 
particular time”,
10
 it misleads insofar as it suggests we might have some sense of what that totality 
is. It is easy to assume that such an overview should be simple to obtain. It is not. Even Statutes in 
Force, had it been successful, encompassed only primary and not secondary legislation, the latter of 
which makes up a far greater volume of legislative material. Electronic databases may lay greater 
claims to comprehensiveness, but the way in which legislation is recorded makes it difficult to obtain 
any overview of the database itself. Such databases cannot readily offer any overview of the totality 
of criminal prohibitions contained in legislation, because most criminal offences are not contained in 
obviously “criminal” legislation. The position remains little different from 1980, when JUSTICE made 
the following remarks as part of a study on “the problem of crimes and contraventions”: 
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At an early stage of our discussion, we began to wonder how many different criminal 
offences it was possible for people to commit in England and Wales. Some of us were naive 
enough to think that it should be easy to discover such a simple thing. In the event, it proved 
to be the most difficult task we set ourselves. Several years and many hundreds of man and 
woman hours later, we still do not know, though we can now make a rather better guess 
than before.
11
 
 
“Frenzied Law Making” 
The lack of any systematic knowledge of the statute book was highlighted more recently when the 
Independent newspaper, in 2006, published an article which has since been regularly cited by 
scholars working on criminal law.
12
 Entitled “Blair’s ‘frenzied law making’: a new offence for every 
day spent in office”,
13
 it claimed an “astonishing tally” of 3023 offences created since May 1997, 
1169 by primary legislation and 1854 by secondary legislation. 
Were these figures correct? The Attorney-General’s office could neither confirm or deny them, being 
quoted as saying that it had no idea how many offences existed. “There are thousands and 
thousands.”
14
 Where exactly the figures came from remains unclear. They were described as having 
been “uncovered” by Nick Clegg, then home affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democrats. Successive 
holders of this role – Simon Hughes, Clegg, and Chris Huhne – spent some time pressing government 
departments to confirm how many criminal offences they had created by legislation, but 
departments frequently declined to give full answers to Parliamentary questions, claiming that the 
information requested could only be provided at disproportionate cost.
15
 
Despite its unclear provenance, the figure of 3023 seems not to have been disputed, and discussion 
focused instead on its significance. It was taken, for example, as evidence that New Labour had been 
“seduced by the politics of penal populism”;
16
 that the criminal law was seen as “a multi-purpose 
solution to contemporary social ills”;
17
 and a “cost driver” affecting the legal aid budget, the cost to 
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which had been given “scant consideration” when such offences were created.
18
 (Commentary, it 
might be noted, was more common from criminologists than criminal lawyers, who tended to note 
the figure with a sense of amazement but to be less clear about just what it might mean.) To these 
complaints, Chris Huhne was later to add the following comments in Parliament: 
The extraordinary creation of offences by the Government is massively complicating the job 
of law enforcement and of the whole criminal justice system. Some of these offences are 
completely bizarre – for example, the offence of causing a nuclear explosion. The idea that 
anyone might cause a nuclear explosion without killing anybody, and therefore being subject 
to a possible charge of murder, is extremely far-fetched. It is perhaps reassuring for some on 
the Government Benches that were there to be a nuclear explosion that did not kill anyone, 
the perpetrator could, indeed, be charged.
19
 
Claims that the criminal law contains absurdities are, of course, nothing new. “Strange-but-true” 
(but frequently not true) laws are a staple of inaccurate media reports.
20
 In 2013, the Law 
Commission published an “informal document” entitled Legal Curiosities: Fact or Fable?, aiming to 
answer queries regularly received by the Commission about “alleged old laws”.
21
 The document 
explained that, for example, it is in fact illegal to wear armour in the Houses of Parliament
22
 or 
handle salmon in suspicious circumstances,
23
 but not – as is often claimed, but without explanation 
of how the offence might be prosecuted – to die in Parliament.
24
 
Perhaps more interesting was the Law Commission’s decision to head up the document with a 
disclaimer that “readers should not rely on it without conducting their own research”, and its 
conclusion that there was “no evidence” regarding four purported offences, including allowing a boy 
under 10 to see a naked mannequin and a woman in Liverpool being “topless in public, except as a 
clerk in a tropical fish store”.
25
 If the conclusions of a statutory body established to keep the law 
under review,
26
 with well-qualified staff and a full range of legal research resources, are not to be 
relied upon by readers, and if that body has to plead “no evidence” when trying to establish whether 
certain criminal offences do exist or have existed, how is any member of the public expected to be 
able to establish what the law is and to adhere to its strictures? 
The material I have mentioned so far suggests three distinct criticisms which might be made of the 
criminal law and the practice of criminalisation. The first is that excessive criminalisation has 
overloaded the criminal justice system. The second is that the criminal law is inaccessible to those 
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who are expected to adhere to its strictures, and the third is that the government has chosen to 
create absurd criminal laws. 
Against this background, the 2010 Liberal Democrat manifesto contained a commitment to “[h]alt 
the increase in unnecessary new offences with the creation of a ‘stop unit’ in the Cabinet Office”,
27
 
something which in due course formed part of the Coalition’s Programme for Government.
28
 Later 
that year, the Ministry of Justice committed itself to publishing annual statistics on the creation of 
new offences, and also to creating a “gateway” mechanism to scrutinise the creation of all new 
criminal offences
29
 – essentially, an email address to which all proposals to create new offences 
must be sent for scrutiny and approval (or rejection) by the Secretary of State for Justice. 
Significantly, the gateway procedure makes no direct attempt to set out any test for determining 
whether or not criminalisation is justified, saying only that it must be “necessary” in order for the 
Secretary of State to approve the proposal. The guidance does, however, set out a list of factors 
which are considered relevant to this decision.
30
 
 
What Do We Know About the Extent of the Criminal Law? 
Before considering whether the 3023 figure justified the claims which have been made about it, it is 
worth noting the existing evidence on the extent of the criminal law. The most influential 
examination of this to date is an exercise carried out by JUSTICE and published in 1980, which 
reviewed the contents of Stone’s Justices Manual, and identified 7,208 discrete criminal offences 
detailed within that publication.
31
 Subsequent estimates of the scope of the criminal law have 
tentatively built on this. In 1999, Andrew Ashworth conservatively revised JUSTICE’s figure upwards 
to estimate that there might then be around 8,000 criminal offences.
32
 In 2008, Fiona Leverick and I 
combined JUSTICE’s figures with the 2006 report of 3,000 new ones to suggest that there were 
“probably over 10,000 different criminal offences in English law”.
33
 
Beyond JUSTICE’s work, there is little academic work that attempts to quantify the scope of the 
criminal law in any way.
34
 Such work as does exist has been deliberately limited in scope, such as 
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examining the number of offences created by primary legislation in particular years,
35
 or those listed 
in Archbold as triable in the Crown Court.
36
 
These exercises have not, of course, been designed for the purpose of quantifying the criminal law 
as such, but instead to allow other analysis to take place. The difficulty with drawing conclusions 
about the overall scope of the criminal law from this work is that it relies on very limited or filtered 
sources. Analysis of primary legislation tells us little about the overall scope of the criminal law, 
because the vast majority of offences (as I shall explain later) are created by secondary legislation. 
Analysing sources such as Archbold or Stone’s Justice’s Manual will provide only an incomplete 
picture, because such sources do not aim at comprehensiveness.
37
 As JUSTICE noted, Stone’s 
Justice’s Manual “only describes in detail those offences which are sufficiently common for 
Magistrates’ Courts to need a ready guide for them”,
38
 and does not include common law offences 
or those created by local legislation.
39
 
A fuller attempt to quantify the scope of the criminal law would necessarily involve a review of 
primary sources – that is, both primary and secondary legislation – rather than any filtered or edited 
source. Even that will produce an incomplete picture, because the power to make criminal offences 
may be delegated to local authorities and regulatory bodies. It is not even clear how many bodies 
actually have the power to make criminal law.
40
 Nevertheless, a review of primary and secondary 
legislation will produce a significantly more comprehensive account than has been achieved before 
now. The aim of such an exercise should not be simply – or perhaps even at all – to establish just 
how many criminal offences there are. As no-one knows how many there should be, that bare figure 
would be of interest but rather unenlightening.
41
 However, systematic analysis of this sort should 
allow us to understand better what might be referred to as “patterns of criminalisation”: for 
example, how and why is the criminal law used by governments? For what purpose are criminal 
offences created, how severely may they be punished, and how has this changed over time? Can we 
say anything meaningful about the content of the criminal law as a whole? 
Fiona Leverick and I have been able to carry out such work recently. We have reported this in detail 
elsewhere,
42
 and so I want simply to refer to some of the key findings of that work for present 
purposes. We canvassed two one-year periods: the first year of the New Labour government elected 
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in 1997, and the first year of the Coalition government which took office in 2010.
43
 The headline 
figure is remarkable: in its first year alone, the New Labour government created 1235 offences 
applicable to England.
44
 The Coalition government created 634 such offences in its first year, 
suggesting that the “gateway” mechanism may have had a salutary effect, particularly as the 
devolved government in Scotland (where there is no “gateway” mechanism) created offences at a 
far faster rate over 2010-11.
45
 
Criminal offences are repealed as well as created, of course. In practical terms, it is more difficult to 
track repeals than enactments: while it is possible to examine the statute book for a particular year 
and assess from the face of that material how many criminal offences it creates, it cannot be 
established how many offences it repealed without significant further research. It will be clear what 
provisions of earlier statutory material have been repealed, but not whether these were offence-
creating ones. However, we did review whether the offences created in 1997-98 remained in force 
in 2011, and our data suggests that by then, around 60% of the offences created in New Labour’s 
first year were no longer in force. This seems simply to reflect the fact that much legislation is 
relatively short-lived: regulatory schemes are constantly being updated and replaced.
46
  
This data reveals something else, which is more surprising at first glance. Three of the 1235 offences 
applicable to England have never been brought into force, including the offence of causing a nuclear 
explosion
47
 – which, as I explained earlier, was given some prominence as evidence of 
overcriminalisation. The reason for this oddity is that the offence was created in order to implement 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,
48
 which is not yet itself in force. Because of this, the UK 
Government has not brought the implementing legislation into force.
49
 
This example highlights that criminalisation may be driven by external obligations.
50
 The majority of 
criminal offences created in 2010-11 arose from European Union (59%) or international (11%) 
obligations, with only 30% of offences not implementing some type of supra-national obligation.
51
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The fact of such obligations does not in itself render the use of the criminal sanction justified, but 
may help to explain more clearly why it has been invoked in particular terms. Left to its own devices, 
it is unlikely that the United Kingdom would have chosen to create a specific offence of causing a 
nuclear explosion. However, it is easy to understand why the UK would support an international 
treaty requiring a state to “prohibit and prevent” nuclear explosions “at any place under its 
jurisdiction or control”.
52
 Even if it could be claimed that existing criminal offences satisfy this 
obligation in full (which is doubtful), the creation of a specific criminal offence is a more effective 
means of demonstrating compliance with this obligation and provides a clearer moral basis for 
persuading other countries to sign up to the treaty. The suggestion that this offence is “completely 
bizarre”
53
 is, it might be said, completely bizarre. 
It might be tempting to assume that much of the criminal law created by legislation each year is 
somehow trivial and regulatory in nature; the kind of material found in subordinate legislation. That 
assumption is both right and wrong: most criminal offences are in fact created by statutory 
instrument (99% in 1997-98 and 86% in 2010-11). However, the majority of criminal offences 
created in both of the sample years were imprisonable: 65% in 1997-98 and 56% in 2010-11. 
Statutory instruments are regularly used to create criminal offences punishable by significant 
periods of imprisonment: there were 22 offences created in 1997-98 and 133 in 2010-11 which 
carried maximum sentences of five years or more. It might be assumed that the creation of criminal 
offences carrying lengthy terms of imprisonment should be a matter for Parliamentary consideration 
rather than ministerial order, but that is not the reality.
54
 
 
How Rapidly has the Criminal Law Really Grown? 
All this is evidence of an important phenomenon, worthy of detailed consideration. But is it a 
relatively new and growing problem? The belief that criminalisation has increased in recent history 
seems to be a widely accepted one: it is something that “can scarcely be doubted”.
55
  A fair 
representation of the prevailing view may be found in the comments of Victor Tadros, who writes 
that the goal that “the criminal law as a whole is one that we can have confidence in... is increasingly 
being set back by the range of trivial offences, obscurely defined and chaotically distinguished, which 
ensure that the criminal law as a whole is properly treated with suspicion”.
56
 In its work on Criminal 
Law in Regulatory Contexts, the Law Commission offered striking evidence of increased 
criminalisation: 
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Since 1997, more than 3000 criminal offences have come on to the statute book. That figure 
should be put in context, taking a longer perspective. Halsbury’s Statutes of England and 
Wales has four volumes devoted to criminal laws that (however old they may be) are still 
currently in force. Volume 1 covers the offences created in the 637 years between 1351 and 
1988. Volume 1 is 1382 pages long. Volumes 2 to 4 cover the offences created in the 19 
years between 1989 and 2008. Volumes 2 to 4 are no less than 3746 pages long. So, more 
than 2 and a half times as many pages were needed in Halsbury’s Statutes to cover offences 
created in the 19 years between 1989 and 2008 than were needed to cover the offences 
created in the 637 years prior to that. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Halsbury volumes 
devoted to ‘criminal law’ capture all offences created in recent times.
57
 
This is a vivid illustration, but a misleading and unhelpful one. First, one would expect any 
compendium of legislation to be more heavily weighted towards recent years, as new legislation 
replaces old. But secondly, and far more importantly, the “criminal law” volumes of Halsbury’s 
Statutes are concerned primarily not with criminal offences, but criminal procedure. The enormous 
growth in these volumes in recent years represents a substantially increased volume of criminal 
justice legislation, but such legislation will often reform procedures or sentencing while creating few 
or no new offences. Most criminal offences will not actually be included in these volumes of 
Halsbury’s Statutes. They are offences created not in “criminal” statutes, but in statutes which 
create criminal offences as part of a broader regulatory scheme. The following table lists all criminal 
offences created in 2011-12, categorised according to a slightly modified version of the categories 
used in Halsbury’s Statutes:
58
 
  2010-2011 
Agriculture (including farming and horticulture) 521 
Terrorism / international sanctions 188 
Water (supply of, excluding nature conservation issues) 171 
Parliament / elections 170 
Food production (excluding agriculture) 138 
Health and care regulation 131 
Environment (including energy conservation and pollution control) 54 
Health and safety at work (including on ships) 45 
Fishing 41 
Sale of goods 34 
Armed forces (including weapons) 33 
Animals (general animal welfare, veterinary medicine) 32 
Other 26 
Criminal law (general) 23 
Land, tenants and housing 22 
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 Law Commission, Criminal Law in Regulatory Contexts (n 54) para 1.17. The measure used by the 
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Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (OUP 2014 (forthcoming). 
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Roads, railways and transport 21 
Nature conservation (including forestry but excluding animals) 20 
Courts and legal services 9 
Children 8 
Shipping and navigation (including port management) 8 
Police (including prisons, private security) 7 
 
The Law Commission’s claim that “it is unlikely that the Halsbury volumes devoted to “criminal law” 
capture all offences created in recent times” is something of an understatement. On the account 
presented in this table, “criminal law” comprised only just over one percent of all the criminal 
offences created in a single year.
59
 That is a paradoxical claim which I will return to shortly. But at 
this stage, we should note that it fatally undermines the Law Commission’s attempt to use the 
“criminal law” volumes of Halsbury’s Statutes to demonstrate rapid growth in the criminal law. In 
fact, we have surprisingly little evidence to support the inference that the creation of criminal 
offences has rapidly increased in recent years, contrary to the assumption that is commonly made. 
We know that the quantity of legislation produced annually – both secondary and primary, and 
crudely measured in terms of pages – increased dramatically over the course of the twentieth 
century,
60
 but that does not in itself evidence an increase in the number of criminal offences 
created. 
In fact, some work in progress at the University of Glasgow,
61
 reviewing the creation of offences over 
1951-1952, suggests that the number of criminal offences created during that year is likely to have 
been higher than the 634 created for England over 2011-12. The creation of regulatory offences in 
significant numbers is not a modern phenomenon.
62
 The claim that the rate at which criminal 
offences are created has increased in recent decades in the United Kingdom has surprisingly little 
evidence to support it, and it may simply be untrue. 
 
Understanding the Subject Matter of Criminal Law 
I noted the oddity of suggesting that “criminal law” accounted for just over one percent of all 
criminal offences created in a given year. How can we make sense of this claim? In trying to answer 
this question, we might begin with some curious comments by Mountifort Longfield – an intriguing 
character who was simultaneously Dublin’s Regius Professor of English and Feudal Law and that 
same institution’s Professor of Political Economy.
63
 In giving evidence to a Select Committee on Legal 
Education in the mid-nineteenth century, he explained his approach to criminal law as follows: 
I try to take a two years’ course; in the course of two years to go through the body of law, 
except that I have never lectured on criminal law, not considering it worth calling the 
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 23 of 1702. 
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 By Fiona Leverick, Alasdair Shaw and myself. 
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 See Jeremy Horder, ‘Bureaucratic “Criminal” Law: Too Much of a Bad Thing?’, in Duff and others (n 58) 
(forthcoming). 
63
 Alan A Tait, ‘Mountifort Longfield 1802-1884: Economist and Lawyer’ (1982) 133 Hermathena 15. 
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attention of students to. There are no fixed principles in it, except that men must not 
commit certain crimes, and if they do, there are certain punishments.
64
 
Criminal law, on this account, consists simply of everything prohibited by the state under threat of 
punishment. On this basis, a textbook of criminal law might simply consist of an alphabetical list of 
crimes and their definitions, and such texts have been written.
65
 
There is, of course, no doubt that we do now have principles of criminal law which can sensibly be 
covered in an introductory course for students,
66
 even if we might have grave reservations about the 
state of these principles.
67
 Principles are expressed primarily in the general part of the criminal law: 
that is, rules applying to more than one crime rather than those setting out the definitions of 
individual offences.
68
 
The special part may then be understood as consisting primarily of the definitions of individual 
offences, but no account of this special part can realistically hope to be comprehensive. Older 
textbooks adopt straightforward if imperfect limiting devices, such as restricting their coverage only 
to imprisonable
69
 or indictable
70
 offences. More recently, Glanville Williams said in his 1978 
Textbook of Criminal Law that “detailed and systematic information about the mass of regulatory 
offences” was “outside my purview”,
71
 adopting a more malleable and elusive distinction: how 
should we decide when something is or is not “regulatory”?
72
 Most, if not all, contemporary 
textbooks dispense with such disclaimers, beginning with a discussion of criminal law’s general part 
before proceeding to a discussion of some specific offences. Few of these books explain why they 
have examined those offences in particular or even acknowledge the selective nature of their 
coverage.
73
 The honourable exception, unsurprisingly, is Andrew Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal 
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Law.
74
 Offences which are not included in the special part may, of course, raise questions about, or 
be illustrative of, general part doctrines such as strict liability or causation, and are frequently 
referred to in this context. They are not airbrushed out of the picture entirely. The point is only that 
it is tacitly accepted as sufficient to say little or nothing about the prohibitions which such offences 
create and the subject-matter which they address. 
Selective coverage is inevitable, but on what basis does this selection rest? It is not that the omitted 
material is in some way “not criminal”. In his 1955 Current Legal Problems lecture, Glanville Williams 
concluded convincingly
75
 that “a crime is an act capable of being followed by criminal proceedings 
having a criminal outcome”.
76
 This approach has been termed “wonderfully circular”
77
 – which it is – 
but the circularity is a meaningful one, cautioning us against fruitless attempts to define crimes by 
reference to some elusive “essentialism”.
78
 Nor is it that the omitted material is criminal but trivial: 
as noted earlier, the majority of criminal offences created by secondary legislation each year are 
imprisonable. 
A possible, if imperfect, explanation for the selectivity of criminal law texts can be found by 
reference to the concept of “special capacity”.
79
 Most criminal offences are addressed not to the 
general public, but to particular sets of persons acting in particular capacities, such as license-
holders, or those undertaking a particular trade or activity. The following table sets out the extent to 
which criminal offences created in 1997-98 and 2010-11 required such special capacity: 
 1997-1998 2010-2011 
None 33 (2%) 200 (11%) 
Role (by virtue of engaging in an activity) 728 (52%) 652 (37%) 
Role (by virtue of being awarded a licence or by registration) 87 (6%) 158 (9%) 
Role (status, e.g. “a debtor”) None 18 (1%) 
Implied special capacity (ordinary people never undertake activity) 256 (18%) 345 (20%) 
Implied special capacity (ordinary people highly unlikely to undertake activity) 47 (3%) 117 (7%) 
Prior circumstances (e.g. receiving information or a donation) 20 (1%) 39 (2%) 
Imposed (prior requirement or direction has been imposed on the accused) 203 (15%) 187 (11%) 
Corporate offence 9 (0.6%) 35 (2%) 
Specific body (e.g. “the harbour trust”) 12 (0.9%) 6 (0.3%) 
Familial None 3 (0.2%) 
Total 1395 1760 
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A fuller account of what is meant by these various categories can be found elsewhere,
80
 but for 
present purposes the key point is that the vast majority of criminal offences are not directed to the 
public at large. Special capacities can vary in their scope, and might range from being a driver of a 
motor vehicle or holding a driving license (covering almost three-quarters of the adult population of 
the United Kingdom)
81
 to the other extreme of being Gwynned Council, the only body capable of 
committing an offence created by a 1998 regulation.
82
 As motoring is such a common activity that 
road traffic offences come close to being directed to the public at large, relatively cursory accounts 
of road traffic offences do sometimes make it into the more comprehensive criminal law 
textbooks,
83
 but otherwise textbook authors quite legitimately concentrate on those offences where 
special capacity is not required. 
There are many other explanations which might be offered for the normal compass of a criminal law 
textbook, such as the focus of criminal law study on those issues which feature prominently in 
appellate decisions, professional requirements (although such requirements may be themselves 
influenced by traditional approaches to the teaching of criminal law and the scope of textbooks) and 
a view that certain elements of the special part are better illustrative of the general part than others. 
None of this is to claim that the narrow focus of a standard criminal law text is wrong. The point is 
merely that it is surprising that this focus is rarely if ever acknowledged let alone explained – the 
potential explanations noted here are not offered in practice – and it is unclear to what extent it is a 
matter of conscious choice as opposed to unconscious evolution in the compass of such texts. 
 
ISCJIS and “Charge Codes”: Some Neglected Evidence 
Even if special capacity provides a rational basis for criminal law texts focusing on some offences and 
not others, it does not fully explain why this focus is a justified one. A criminal offence may be 
incapable of commission other than by a set group of people, but it nevertheless remains a criminal 
offence, and a basis for the state inflicting hard treatment on an individual. 
Some further light may be shed on this issue by an examination of a neglected source: “charge 
codes” produced for the purpose of ISCJIS, the Integrated Scottish Criminal Justice Information 
System. ISCJIS is an initiative designed to allow for the electronic exchange of information between 
different criminal justice agencies.
84
 Charge codes provide a mechanism for criminal justice agencies 
to record specific offences in their systems. This code set is regularly updated, and there is a 
protocol permitting agencies to request new codes where necessary. 
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In the June 2013 set of codes, there were 5533 codes available.
85
 This is not a comprehensive list of 
all criminal offences which might be committed. It was originally compiled by Crown Office (the 
Scottish prosecution service) reviewing all charges prosecuted “within the last few years” and 
allocating a code to each of them.
86
 The code set is updated as necessary,
87
 which may include 
adding codes for offences which have been on the statute book for some time. The June 2013 
update, for example, included the insertion of codes relating to offences created in 1994
88
 and 
2005.
89
 
A cursory examination of the ISCJIS code set reveals a picture which is rather closer to the textbook 
accounts of criminal law than to the statute book as a whole. While it still contains a significant 
number of offences involving special capacity (primarily road traffic and health and safety offences), 
it is not dominated by them in the same way that the overall criminal statute book would seem to 
be. As a list of offences, it would be more readily recognised as the “criminal law” by a lay person 
than any complete list of offences which might be compiled. It is remarkable because it represents 
the subset of the criminal law which has actually resulted in prosecution in recent years in Scotland, 
and evidences the extent to which a significant raft of offences never actually trouble the courts. 
In broad terms, we may be said to have two types of criminal law, with one being a subset of the 
other. The first is the entire criminal statute book;
90
 the second is the subset of that book which is 
actually enforced by the criminal justice system. As Nicola Lacey has suggested, we can usefully 
distinguish between “formal” criminalisation (the law on the books) and “substantive” 
criminalisation (the law in action).
91
 The line between these two types of criminalisation is not a 
sharp one, and we should not assume that formal criminalisation does not matter or can be 
disregarded as far less important than substantive criminalisation. For example, the fact that an 
offence does not trouble the courts tells us little or nothing about informal interventions by the 
police, regulatory bodies or other agencies, nor about the steps people take to comply with the 
criminal law without official intervention. Additionally, criminal offences which are rarely enforced 
raise significant concerns of potential arbitrariness in the application of the criminal law. 
 
Conclusion: Real and Unreal Problems 
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As I explained earlier, the modern critique of overcriminalisation has centred on three apparent 
problems: overuse of the criminal justice system, inaccessibility of the criminal law, and absurdity. 
Some of these criticisms, however, are overstated. First of all, the critique rests on shaky 
foundations. The extent – if any – to which the size of the criminal statute book has increased in 
recent years is unclear. Regulatory criminal law – indeed, an extensive volume of such law – is a 
longstanding feature of the criminal law and not a new phenomenon.
92
 Even if the volume of 
criminal law has increased, the link between such criminalisation and the work of the criminal justice 
system is a weak and attenuated one given the extent to which many criminal offences will never be 
prosecuted. Two caveats are important, however. First, the threat of the criminal sanction remains: 
this can have a chilling effect on the behaviour of individuals, and the lack of enforcement of any 
criminal offence does not mean that there are not real social and economic costs associated with its 
presence on the books. Secondly, the observations here are not intended to make any claim about 
whether the criminal justice system is in fact being overused, but simply to suggest that if it is this is 
likely to be for reasons other than the creation of substantial numbers of new offences.  
I have not sought to explore the question of absurdity in detail here, as it is difficult to examine in 
the abstract rather than individually in relation to specific provisions. I would suggest only that there 
is a risk of exaggerating this point. Governments are unlikely to resort arbitrarily to the use of the 
criminal sanction, and individual examples which may seem perplexing on their face – such as the 
offence of causing a nuclear explosion – are likely to have a rational explanation when examined 
further, particularly when the significance of international obligations in criminalisation decisions is 
recognised. That is not to say that such laws are good laws, necessary laws, or fairly-defined ones. 
Avoiding absurdity is not much of an achievement. 
The problem of accessibility, however, is a rather more real one. I have said less about this here, as 
my aim has been to dispel particular misconceptions about overcriminalisation, but we have a 
significant volume of criminal law which is relatively inaccessible, difficult to comprehend, or both,
93
 
something which is problematic in its own right but worsened by the extremely restrictive approach 
taken to the defence of mistake of law in the United Kingdom.
94
 This presents challenges which are 
difficult enough for lawyers, let alone lay individuals who are expected to adhere to the law’s 
strictures. The problem of accessibility is not one which is addressed by measures such as the 
Ministry of Justice’s Gateway mechanism which target the quantity rather than the quality of 
criminal law. 
While accessibility is to some degree improved by the developments in the publication of statutory 
information I mentioned earlier, this is of limited value when the material is organised in such a way 
as to make it obtainable but difficult to interrogate (due to volume) or comprehend (due to 
complexity). Moreover, problems of accessibility can only be mitigated rather than removed by any 
process of decriminalisation which retains a regulatory framework but does not rely on the criminal 
law for its enforcement. All this presents two clear challenges, which may be noted in conclusion. 
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First, there is an obligation on governments to recognise the importance of good law-making.
95
 
Secondly, there is a challenge for criminal law scholarship, which must be more alert to the 
regulatory function of criminal law,
96
 and more nuanced in its analysis of superficially attractive 
claims of overcriminalisation. 
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